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Research on fertility changes in former Soviet states of the South Caucasus is scant
and has overlooked the role of armed conflicts. This study contributes to filling these
gaps by providing the first detailed account of fertility changes in Azerbaijan since
independence and by exploring them in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
with Armenia. Estimates from retrospective birth history data from the 2006 Demo-
graphic and Health Survey show that since 1991 period fertility declined to almost
below-replacement levels, essentially as a result of stopping behavior, and, only re-
cently, slight birth postponement. While the conflict seems to have little influence on
aggregate trends, discrete-time logit models accounting for unobserved heterogeneity
reveal a 42–45 percent higher risk of transitioning to the second birth for women
who have been exposed to conflict violence—whether in the form of forced migration
or because of residence in the conflict-torn Karabakh region—than for nonexposed
women. Never-migrant women from Karabakh have also significantly higher proba-
bility of having a first child. Further positive effects on fertility are observed for women
who lost a child during peak conflict years. Risk-insurance and replacement effects
are possible mechanisms explaining such fertility responses.
Introduction
Armed conflicts represent one of the most important and recurring chal-
lenges facing human societies, with currently almost two billion people liv-
ing in areas affected by violence and political instability worldwide (World
Bank 2017). While some of the demographic consequences of conflict
violence—mortality and forced migration in particular—receive substantial
attention in population studies and considerable media coverage, there has
been less research interest on the fertility effects of armed conflicts (Brun-
borg and Tabeau 2005; D’Aoust and Guha-Sapir 2010). This is of concern.
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First, in most societies, the family, its composition, and functioning are
still fundamental to individuals’ perception of life quality and well-being
(Pichler 2006; Alesina and Giuliano 2010). This centrality is especially true
for those living in conditions of protracted physical, political, and eco-
nomic insecurity, where the family represents the basic unit of subsistence
and a key element in people’s coping strategies (Justino 2011). Addressing
how situations of violence and insecurity influence the family domain and
household childbearing decisions is important to ensure and promote indi-
vidual and community resilience. Second, lack of focus on fertility highlights
gaps in our understanding of differences in vulnerability between women
and men in conflict settings. Although men are typically more likely to be
affected by conflict in terms of physical morbidity and mortality, women
face other insidious challenges and often endure more heavily the burden
of diminishing family resources (McKay 1998; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett
2003; Plümper and Neumayer 2006). For instance, in times of crises impov-
erished households may prefer to interrupt the education of their young
childless women to marry them as a way of reducing family financial “bur-
den” and securing access to alternative means of sustenance (Shemyakina
2011, 2013). In contexts where childbearing is strongly tied to marriage, an
acceleration in the timing of union formation is likely to encourage to early
childbearing (Khawaja and Randall 2006), a factor commonly associated
with various negative health outcomes and educational and socioeconomic
disadvantage (UNICEF 2005; Nour 2006). Thus, examining the contribu-
tion of conflict to changes in fertility can shed light on the female condition
and status in the household and has implications for postconflict develop-
ment and gender equality. Third, knowledge on how fertility decisions are
made during conflict would advance our theoretical understanding of the
drivers of contemporary long-term population change. In turn, this could
inform family planning, health, and education strategies in conflict-ridden
and postconflict settings where policy decisions, and often the institutions
setting them, may have to be created from scratch.
Scarcity of research on the conflict–fertility nexus is particularly
visible in the ex-Soviet space. This should not come as a surprise, as the
USSR’s dissolution is still widely regarded as a “uniquely peaceful geopo-
litical catastrophe” (Baev 2007, 250). In reality, the demise of the Union
created disaster zones where violence quickly emerged (Broers 2016). This
is the case in Azerbaijan, a country historically located at the cross-roads
of territorial struggles between Persian, Ottoman, and Russian empires,
and which has been embroiled since 1991 in an interstate war, now of-
ficially termed a “frozen conflict,” with its neighbor Armenia over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region. Furthermore, while a number of studies have
investigated fertility changes in post-Soviet Central and Eastern Europe
(Kohler and Kohler 2002; Macura and MacDonald 2003; Sobotka et al.
2003; Sobotka 2004; Perelli-Harris 2005; Kotowska et al. 2008; Billingsley
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2010), and Central Asian republics (Agadjanian and Makarova 2003;
Agadjanian, Dommaraju, and Glick 2008; Clifford, Falkingham, and Hinde
2010; Agadjanian, Dommaraju, and Nedoluzhko 2013; Spoorenberg 2013,
2015), the fertility trajectories of countries in the South Caucasus remain
largely undocumented. To date, no study has investigated the fertility
dynamics of independent Azerbaijan and assessed the factors, including
conflict, that might have contributed to changing fertility patterns in the
early and late post-Soviet period.
The first aim of this paper is thus to complement and expand ex-
isting literature on post-Soviet fertility changes by retracing Azerbaijan’s
long-term fertility dynamics and describing the nature of their evolution,
including aggregate, age- and parity-specific changes. A detailed recon-
struction of these trends is required to determine the country’s current
stage in the fertility transition and to observe whether changes are related
in time with conflict hostilities. The second objective is then to specifically
address the questions of whether and how exposure to conflict violence
was related to changes in fertility. In particular, the study employs birth
history data from the 2006 Azerbaijan Demographic and Health Survey
(AZ-DHS) and discrete-time survival models accounting for unobserved
individual heterogeneity to explore the association between exposure to
conflict and the transitions to first, second, and third birth.
Theoretical expectations on the broad conflict–fertility relationship
are ambiguous: individuals may accelerate the transition to childbearing
to buffer future economic uncertainty, following the loss of a child or for
other reasons like nationalist pronatalist motives; alternatively, they may
postpone births in hope of better times or because of trade-offs between
child quantity and quality. Existing evidence is also inconclusive, possibly
because different types of conflict and actors involved (e.g., interstate vs.
intrastate violence) trigger different fertility responses (Neal, Stone, and
Ingham 2016). Additionally, extant research has so far mainly focused on
aggregate trends; that is, on whether conflict-exposed households increase
or lower their fertility. This implicitly neglects the fact that the relationship
between conflict and childbearing decisions is likely to differ by parity and
be linked to the country’s stage in the fertility transition.
This article therefore contributes to the theoretical debate by providing
evidence from a neglected conflict zone, where the interplay between ethnic
and political drives as well as the emergence of nationalist ideologies against
the external “enemy” might have translated into higher fertility among the
conflict exposed. Moreover, by looking at subsequent transitions, it adds to
the literature by examining the hypothesis that the relationship between
conflict violence and fertility decisions varies by parity. It shows then that
conflict mainly influences the decision to transition to the average parity,
here the second child.
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Examining fertility responses to conflict violence is consequential for
policymaking: for instance, evidence of higher fertility in conflict-affected
households would require scaling up the resources for maternal and new-
born health as well as family planning services devoted to such subgroups.
Similarly, it may flag cohort-size effects which, if not addressed with prompt
responses, might trigger additional social distress and frustration in already
vulnerable groups, especially in the labor and marriage markets (Urdal
2006). Hence, the results of this study serve as inputs for the design of
strategies targeting vulnerable populations such as refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan as well as in other conflict-prone ar-
eas with similar historical past, like Dagestan and Donbass.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss
the literature guiding the study—including theory on the conflict–fertility
nexus and existing evidence on fertility changes in the post-Soviet space—
and introduce the study context to inform my expectations about fertility
changes and responses to conflict in Azerbaijan. Next, I describe the data
and methodological strategies used in the analyses. I then present the re-
sults of trend analyses since independence and of statistical models and dis-
cuss themwith reference to Azerbaijan’s institutional and historical context,
to population developments in the larger ex-Soviet sphere, and to other
conflict-torn settings. The policy implications of the findings and steps for
future research output are also considered.
Background
The conflict and fertility relationship
As Randall argues, “[armed] conflict is part of the human condition and
therefore should be integral to all analyses and interpretation of demo-
graphic behaviour” (2005, 292). Although research on the demographic
consequences of armed conflict has grown substantially, it still concen-
trates on direct effects; for example, excess mortality, migration, and
displacement.1 The question of how conflict violence affects overall fer-
tility has not attracted comparable attention, though its disproportionate
long-term effects on women and the centrality of family support in unset-
tled times are well known (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Austin et al.
2008; Patel et al. 2016). Empirical knowledge of its impacts at different birth
orders is even thinner and has not yet been adequately articulated in theo-
retical discourses.
Most accounts of the relationship between conflict and fertility are
historical studies of the consequences of World Wars I and II on Western
European childbearing patterns. These typically document a “pro-cyclical”
relationship, whereby wartime fertility drops are followed by postwar
compensatory “baby booms” (Hobcraft 1996; Rindfuss and Sweet 2006).
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Experiences of conflict-related fertility declines have then been docu-
mented in some low- and middle-income countries during the 1990s. In
Central Asia, Clifford, Falkingham, and Hinde (2010) noted period declines
during the Tajik civil conflict. Yet, the authors contended that the drop was
more the result of fallacious vital registration than of a real decline due to
conflict. Lindstrom and Berhanu (1999) detected short-term declines in
conceptions in Ethiopia during years of military unrest, with the caveat
that this period also coincided with crop failures and drought, making
it hard to disentangle the effect of each disruptive event. The Rwandan
genocide was associated with postponement of first birth (Jayaraman,
Gebreselassie, and Chandrasekhar 2009) although only in the short term
(Schindler and Brück 2011). Temporary declines were also observed in
Cambodia (De Walque 2006), Angola (Agadjanian and Prata 2002), in
Sarajevo during the Bosnian war (Hill 2004), and in Eritrea (Woldemicael
2008).
While most research suggests “disruptive” effects of conflict on fer-
tility, some country-specific studies in Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan
African countries and, more recently, Latin America provide evidence for
the “fertility promotion” hypothesis (see, for instance, Abbasi-Shavazi,
McDonald, and Hosseini-Chavoshi (2009) for Iran; Cetorelli (2014) for
Iraq; Yucesahin and Ozgur (2008) for Kurdish populations in south-eastern
Turkey; Khawaja and Randall (2006) for the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ries; Schindler and Brück (2011) and Kraehnert et al. (2019) for Rwanda,
and Castro Torres and Urdinola (2019) for Colombia). A positive relation-
ship is also documented at the macrolevel. For instance, using time-series
multicountry information for the 1970–2005 period, Urdal and Che (2013)
identified higher aggregate fertility correlated with the presence of armed
conflict in low-income countries. Nonetheless, although peaks and troughs
in reproductive patterns in conflict settings seem to be common, other
studies—whether cross-country (Iqbal 2010) or microlevel ones (Ladier-
Fouladi and Hourcade 1997; Saxena et al. 2004)—found no association or
fertility response to conflict violence.
Existing studies reveal the complexity of fertility responses to armed
violence and point to distinct direct and indirect mechanisms eliciting them.
With regard to direct effects, economic explanations based on the quantity–
quality framework (Becker and Lewis 1973) suggest that conflict-induced
hardship increases couples’ awareness of the costs associated with each
additional child and highlight the advantages of having fewer mouths to
feed, thereby leading to conscious efforts to delay or reduce childbearing.
Similarly, spousal separation, population displacement, and conscription
can directly depress fertility (Hill 2004; Lindstrom and Berhanu 1999).
By contrast, the “risk-insurance” approach to fertility suggests that, under
conditions of generalized instability and economic dislocation, replacement
fertility operates as a direct intentional coping strategy for households to
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preserve or increase their future sources of income and to compensate
for the potential loss of already-born children (Verwimp and van Bavel
2005). Sexual violence, especially when used as a weapon of war, can also
contribute to increases in the number of (unintended) births (Staveteig
2011).
Indirect mechanisms relate more to psychological and biological fac-
tors. For instance, conflict-induced stress and impairment can have unin-
tended disruptive effects on fecundity and reduce the frequency of inter-
course, thus lowering overall fertility (Palloni, Hill, and Aguirre 1996). By
the same token, the detrimental consequences conflict has on community
infrastructures, like roads, water systems, health facilities, can affect the or-
ganization of food supply (Van Herp et al. 2003). Women’s ensuing wors-
ened nutritional status can then too have indirect disruptive effects on fertil-
ity. On the other side, as the psychology literature and “attachment theory”
propose, that during periods of heightened stress, individual need for emo-
tional and physical support from loved ones may increase frequency of in-
tercourse and thus, indirectly, fertility (Cohan and Cole 2002). Childbearing
may also be a way to “normalize” one’s life in the face of traumatic events
(Carta et al. 2012). Other indirect factors, for example, the breakdown of
community institutions, family planning services, and disruption of health
systems can also trigger fertility increases (Tabeau and Bijak 2005). Last,
but important, in enduring interstate confrontations, increasing nationalist
rhetoric, and the perceived need to maintain a demographic balance with
the opposing group can culminate into pronatalist feelings or even pop-
ulation policies encouraging childbearing (Fargues 2000; Abbasi-Shavazi,
McDonald, Hosseini-Chavoshi 2009).
Overall, such mixed evidence on the conflict–fertility relationship
gives credence to Sillanpäa’s (2002) view that the demographic impact of
armed conflicts varies according to the typology of the conflict, its severity
and duration, and across population subgroups. Notably, when it comes to
reproduction, this further suggests that differential responses are likely to
emerge at different stages of the fertility transition and as a result of pre-
existing norms around childbearing. The next sections provide background
information on post-Soviet fertility changes to inform expectations on re-
sponses to conflict in Azerbaijan.
Post-Soviet transitions and fertility changes
To date, limited evidence on the conflict–fertility relationship has come
from former Soviet countries and no study has assessed changes in fertil-
ity here that might have occurred in conjunction with interstate armed
violence, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan. More
generally, fertility trends and patterns in postindependence Azerbaijan have
been largely overlooked. By contrast, extended literature documented the
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fertility declines that came about following the collapse of the Soviet Union
in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in some Commonwealth
Independent States (CIS) (Kohler and Kohler 2002; Macura and MacDon-
ald 2003; Sobotka et al. 2003; Sobotka 2004; Perelli-Harris 2005; Kotowska
et al. 2008; Billingsley 2010) and in Central Asian republics (Agadjanian
and Makarova 2003; Agadjanian, Dommaraju, and Glick 2008; Clifford,
Falkingham, and Hinde 2010; Agadjanian, Dommaraju, and Nedoluzhko
2013; Spoorenberg 2013, 2015). This body of literature showed that al-
though the decline was a common pattern across the entire ex-Soviet
space, the nature of the changes differed by region.
In Central Europe,2 where the economic and political transitions
had been less traumatic, the decline resulted primarily from timing effects
(Sobotka 2004); that is, increasing mean age of first birth. This “starting-
later” pattern has been attributed to ideational shifts favoring the adoption
of “Western” reproductive and family models, including increased indi-
vidualism and female autonomy (Rabusic 2001; Spéder 2006; Kotowska
et al. 2008). Conversely, South-Eastern Europe,3 Slavic CIS,4 and Central
Asian countries5 faced wide social and structural problems which allegedly
prevented such ideological shifts. Here, economic impoverishment and
uncertainty triggered quantum effects and a “stopping-sooner” behavior,
leading to birth limitation at high parities and to an increasing proportion
of one-child families (Agadjanian and Makarova 2003; Sobotka 2004;
Perelli-Harris 2005; Agadjanian, Dommaraju, and Glick 2008; Gjonca,
Aassve, and Mencarini 2008; Spoorenberg 2009; Clifford, Falkingham, and
Hinde 2010; Shakhotska 2011). The one study on a Caucasian country, Ar-
menia, suggests some parallels with this latter type of response (Billingsley
2011).
Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Socioeconomic changes
and the conflict with Armenia
Azerbaijan’s early transition period was tumultuous. Anomie, trade disrup-
tion, and political dislocation led to the crumbling of the economy (Cornell
2017). In the 5 years between 1990 and 1995, hyperinflation caused
recorded real wages to decline by 86 percent and per capita GDP bottomed
at USD 173 (Singh and Laurila 2011). The loss of the Russian market—to
which Azerbaijan exported much of its agricultural output, as well as
reductions in subsidies, curtailed one of the country’s most important
employment sectors (World Bank 2005). All of this was accompanied by
structural and institutionalized corruption, which already affected Azerbai-
jan during the Soviet era (Clark 1993). However, as opposed to most other
former constituent parts of the USSR, in Azerbaijan, a violent struggle
for power and space further complicated the path to regime change. For
its entire post-independence period, Azerbaijan has been at war with its
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neighbor Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a landlocked ter-
ritory internationally recognized as belonging to Azerbaijan (UN Security
Council 1993a-d; OSCE 2008; UN General Assembly 2008; Broers 2016),
but which Yerevan claims to be an integral part of historical Armenian land
(Human Rights Watch 1994; Cornell 2001; Armenia Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2020).6
The genesis of tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia can be traced
back to the late 1980s when officials of the then Soviet Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) asked Moscow to be incorporated into the
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (Human Rights Watch 1992, 1994;
Cornell 2001; de Waal 2004; Broers 2016; The World Factbook 2017).
Pro-unification demonstrations in Armenia were held in Yerevan and in
the capital of NKAO Stepanakert (known as Khankendi in Azerbaijani
language), triggering the intervention of Soviet troops as well as waves
of displacement on both sides. The early stages of the confrontation were
characterized by several acts of violence, like the 1988 anti-Armenian
retaliatory raids in Baku’s industrial suburb of Sumgait, when many
Azerbaijanis, including refugees recently arrived from Armenia, attacked
the homes of ethnic Armenian residents. The fighting caused 32 official
deaths and forced Armenians to flee (Human Rights Watch 1992; Cornell
2001; de Waal 2004). Although disagreement exists on the exact start of
the hostilities, most analysts and official sources indicate late 19917 as the
beginning of the full-scale war and recognize 1992–1994 as the peak years
of hostilities (Human Rights Watch 1992, 1994; International Crisis Group
(ICG) 2005; Hopmann and Zartman 2010; Huseynov 2010; Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe and Washington (CSCE) 2012; Cornell
2015), when most conflict events occurred (Figure 1). The year 1992,
in particular, was characterized by several acts of violence, including the
Armenian offensive on the Azerbaijani-populated town of Khojali (Human
Rights Watch 1992; Pope 1992; Lieven 1992; De Waal 2004; ICG 2005;
Goltz 2015). Armenians later seized Shusha, the major city of the Karabakh
region, the neighboring district of Lachin, and parts of other Azerbaijani
districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh.8 In May 1994, the opposing parties
signed an armistice agreement which led to the creation of a de facto
Republic of Karabakh (known as Republic of Artsakh). Since then, though,
negotiations have stalled, and a number of ceasefire violations have been
registered.
The conflict has caused significant loss of human life. Although the
count of fatalities is hard to verify, it has been estimated around 17–25
thousand deaths (U.S. Department of State 1993; Human Rights Watch
1994; Yunusov 2002; DeWaal 2004; Cornell 2015; CSCE 2017; UCDP- GED
2019). The scale of forced displacement was even larger. Between 750, 000
and 1,000,000 Azerbaijanis were uprooted form Nagorno-Karabakh or fled
Armenia, sometimes under violent circumstances and were displaced across
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FIGURE 1 Count of conflict events, Azerbaijan 1991–2018
NOTE: Number of conflict events causing at least one casualty. Darker bars highlight the observation period
covered by the AZ-DHS. Note that UCDP-GED started to collect data on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1991
only. For this reason and, importantly, for consistency with official sources, deaths caused in earlier years are
not included.
SOURCE: UCDP-GED (2019).
the territory of Azerbaijan (Human Rights Watch 1994; Yunusov 2002;
De Waal 2004; UNHCR 2009; Cornell 2015).9 Such a large flow of forced
migrants—about 10 to 15 percent of the country’s then total population
of 8 million—generated vast social stress which endures today. For many
years, Azerbaijan has been the country with the largest per capita num-
ber of IDPs in its national population (Greenway 2009; Gureyeva-Aliyeva
and Huseynov 2011) and, although the last official refugee/IDP camp was
closed in 2007, as late as 2016, one in 15 Azerbaijanis was still a refugee/IDP
(UNHCR 2017).
While the territorial dispute over Karabakh is often defined as a “frozen
conflict” (Grant 2017, 380–382; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (PACE) 2015), the sheer scale of suffering and scars it produced
are still visible and periodic skirmishes continue to challenge the lives of
both Armenian and Azerbaijani civilian populations. Recent years have
seen a worrisome increasing trend in conflict incidents (Figure 1) as well
as in the number of casualties (U.S. Department of State 2016; UCDP-GED
2019).10 This highlights that similar unresolved security vacuums in the re-
gion are by no means frozen (Cornell 2015); rather, they continue to cause
510 ARMED CONFLICT AND THE TIMING OF CHILDBEARING IN AZERBAIJAN
uncertainty and fuel nationalist sentiments, which might influence house-
holds’ childbearing decisions.
Data and measures
When official civil registries are flawed, as may be expected in conflict-
affected countries, data from nationally representative surveys can be used
to reconstruct fertility patterns, analyze their components, and test em-
pirical associations between a wide range of variables (Woldemicael 2008;
Clifford, Falkingham, and Hinde 2010; Cetorelli 2014). In addition, surveys
might be preferred in contexts where there is evidence of underregistration
of births. As in other parts of the former USSR, underreporting, particularly
of female births, occurred in Soviet Azerbaijan, due to registration depend-
ing on citizens’ initiative, discrepancies in international/Soviet definitions
of “live birth” and registration fees (Jones and Grupp 1987; Anderson and
Silver 1989; Phillips, Adair, and Lopez 2018).
For these reasons, the primary data source for this study is the AZ-DHS,
implemented in Azerbaijan between July and November 2006. The survey
collected data on important indicators of social development, including fer-
tility histories, health, and aspects of household welfare from a nationally
representative sample of 8,444 women aged 15–49, with a nearly universal
response rate. The survey sample was generated in two stages. First, clus-
ters were selected in Baku and in the eight other economic administrative
regions of the country from the 1999 Population Census sample frame. In
the second stage, households were listed in each cluster and systematically
selected.11,12 It is important to note that, due to security reasons, the survey
covered only selected areas of the contested Karabakh territories (Agdam
and Terter districts and part of the Fizuli district) and did not include the
Nakhchivan exclave and the Kelbajar and Lachin districts, the latter two be-
ing under the control of Armenian-backed separatist Republic of Artsakh.
Figure 2, using georeferenced data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP-GED 2019), shows the spatial distri-
bution of violent events that occurred in the peak years of the conflict and
soon after the 1994 armistice in relation to the sampling strategy of the
2006 AZ-DHS. Of the total conflict events occurred between 1992 and 1996
(n = 298)13, the vast majority (about 81 percent) occurred in the contested
region and sampled part of Karabakh. This, together with the fact that en-
tire ethnic Azerbaijani population fled the districts of Lachin and Kelbajar
during the war (ICG 2019) (according to the 2005 Census of the Republic of
Artsakh (National Statistical Service of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic 2006),
only ethnic Armenians—not the focus of this paper—have settled in these
districts) should limit issues around sample selection bias and permits the
correct identification of those exposed to violence.
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FIGURE 2 Map of conflict events, Azerbaijan 1992–1996
NOTE: Areas in light grey indicate the non-sampled Nakhchivan and Kalbajar and Lachin districts. Areas in
dark grey delineate the sampled districts of the Yukhari-Karabakh region (Agdam, Terter and Fizuli districts).
Larger dots indicate areas with higher number of conflict events causing at least one casualty. All conflict
events displayed in the map took place between 1992–1996. All conflict events in the non-sampled exclave of
Nakhichevan occurred in 1992 and were coded by UCDP-GED as: “State-based violence between Side A:
Government of Azerbaijan and Side B: Republic of Artsakh”.
SOURCE: UCDP-GED (2019).
To determine changes in fertility associated with overall exposure to
armed violence, it is necessary to identify the exposed. As the literature
on conflict and violence highlights, exposure to conflict can take differ-
ent forms (Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2011). Experiences of armed violence
can be direct and immediate (e.g., suffering physical aggression, being in-
jured, experiencing house damage or disruption), and/or indirect and more
chronic (e.g., forced displacement, geographical proximity to actual fight-
ing/bombings, witnessing the death of loved ones and friends, being the
relative of survivors). Although diverse, both types are likely to exert an
influence over individual behavior, including over fertility decisions (Plüm-
per and Neumayer 2006; Alsaba and Kapilashrami 2016; Curiel and Bishop
2018). This understanding of conflict exposure forms the basis for how I
next operationalize its measurements.
A key feature of the AZ-DHS household questionnaire is that it asked
all family members aged 16+ at interview time about their IDP or refugee
status. If the individual self-defined as either refugee or IDP, he/shewas then
asked about his/her previous district or country of residence. This permits
the identification of household members and women who have had direct
experience of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and who also experienced
one of its indirect ramifications; that is, forced displacement from the con-
512 ARMED CONFLICT AND THE TIMING OF CHILDBEARING IN AZERBAIJAN
tested territories or migration from Armenia.14 Further, the survey provides
information on respondents’ current place of residence and on the length
of their stay in that location. I use this information to identify women who
have “always” lived in sampled conflict-torn districts of Karabakh (Agdam,
Terter, and Fizuli) or moved to these areas before the conflict erupted in full
scale.While these women did not experience conflict-induced displacement
and, perhaps, might not have been as explicitly involved with disruption or
killings (although Figure 2 shows that conflict events causing at least one
casualty occurred all across the sampled part of Karabakh), they likely ex-
perienced recurring and more subtle conflict-related uncertainty (e.g., fear
of coercive acts, land mines, land expropriation, or simply of warfare ex-
tending to their territories), precisely because of their residential proximity
to the conflict line. It is again worth stressing the relevance of this differ-
entiation as experiences of conflict violence and family-related decisions
can be expected to vary between forced migrants and stayers. Moreover,
including women who likely mainly had indirect experiences of violence
is important as it allows to more confidently attribute behavioral responses
to other, more hidden aspects of violence, like uncertainty and fear, that
reasonably have been experienced by a large subgroup of the population.
I thus exploit this valuable survey information to construct two
different conflict exposure indicators based on a “narrow” and a “broad”
definition of conflict exposure. The former defines as exposed to conflict vi-
olence women who (i) always resided in Karabakh territories (or migrated
there before the conflict erupted) and (ii) women who self-identified as
refugees from Armenia/IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh. The latter further
includes (iii) women who were not refugees or IDPs, but whose husbands
were. This is because family-size decision-making is the result of an inter-
action process between the individual preferences of each partner, and thus
a choice jointly taken at the household level (Stein, Willen, and Pavetic
2014). Although women are the main agents and reporters of childbearing
events, in a patriarchal society like that of Azerbaijan, limiting the measure
to women’s conflict status only may not fully capture the influence of
conflict on fertility decision-making. Exposed women are then compared
to nonexposed women, that is women who were not directly exposed to
violence from the Karabakh conflict or did not have indirect experience of
it as they lived farther away from the conflict zone.
It is here worth mentioning that several studies addressing conflict ef-
fects on individual outcomes take advantage of the georeferenced nature of
many household surveys and link them to subnational data on conflict vi-
olence from datasets like the UCDP-GED to create continuous indicators of
conflict intensity (see, for instance, Østby (2016) or Lindskog (2016) among
others). Unfortunately, the AZ-DHS did not collect fine-grained georefer-
enced cluster data that would allow constructing similar measures. Even at
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a higher spatial scale, AZ-DHS data are not comprehensive enough to obtain
precise matching. For instance, information on district of residence are not
available for all women: while it is possible to trace back the origin district
of IDPs before they fled Nagorno-Karabakh, the AZ-DHS only provides
numerical information on the current district of residence of other women,
including refugees from Armenia. This means that we know their economic
region of residence (e.g., Yukhari Karabakh, Aran, Ganja Gazakh, Baku, and
so on), but not their specific district in that region.15 The fact that the area
size of these economic zones is substantially large16—together with the lack
of full migration histories—makes super district-level linkage with conflict
data hardly useful and prone to large measurement error. For these reasons,
I opted for measures mainly based on individual self-reported conflict status
and on geographical location only for those who never left the sampled
conflict districts. Evidently, favoring a more conservative measurement
over a more detailed one also reduces my capacity to distinguish women
who, for instance, lived in the few conflict-affected districts in the economic
region of Ganja Gazakh (North West) bordering Nagorno-Karabakh from
those who did not, but resided in the same region. Non-IDP/refugee women
(as well as women whose husband was not affected by the conflict) in these
regions are therefore all coded as nonexposed. Nonetheless, the fact that
the vast majority of conflict events occurred in the sampled Karabakh
districts should help to limit errors in the correct attribution of conflict
exposure.
Table 1 presents the background characteristics of samples of ever-
married women in Azerbaijan by conflict status used in the statistical
analyses.17 Despite the diverse experiences of violence, conflict-exposed
and nonexposed women do not largely differ in their fertility-related char-
acteristics. For instance, both groups report similar averages of children ever
born (about 1.70 per woman), except those residing in the Karabakh re-
gion (1.88 children per woman). There is a difference in age at marriage
across differently affected groups, with exposed women marrying slightly,
but significantly later than nonexposed ones (21.30 vs. 22.01). No marked
differences, by contrast, emerge across conflict groups in terms of age at first
and subsequent births, although nonexposed women have children slightly
earlier (but not significantly so) than their more exposed counterparts.
The groups show more diverging socioeconomic profiles. Conflict-exposed
women are more urbanized than the nonexposed, IDPs, and refugees espe-
cially. By contrast, residents in the Karabakh region are disproportionately
more rural. This is expected, as according to official data collected around
the time of and some after the implementation of the 2006 AZ-DHS, around
70 percent of IDPs and refugees in Azerbaijan resided in urban areas or peri-
urban settings (World Bank 2010, 2018), where camps were more readily
available and services for such population groups more easily accessible at
the time of harsh conflict hostilities. The education differences among the
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TABLE 1 Key summary statistics of AZ-DHS weighted samples of ever
married women by conflict status






Urban 53.27 61.36 8.09 0.154 72.32 11.77 54.38




70.97 66.91 4.06 0.542 66.11 70.51 70.41
Secondary
special
15.98 19.63 −3.65 19.95 18.95 16.48
Higher 13.05 13.46 −0.41 13.94 11.94 13.10
Age (mean,
years)

















27.21 27.68 −0.47 0.438 27.91 27.01 27.26
Children ever
born (mean)









1.63 2.82 −1.19 0.525 2.78 2.88 1.77
Percentage in
sample
82.41 17.59 8.89 8.70 100
NOTE: Exposed women are defined using the “broad” definition of conflict exposure. The IDP/refugee sample
includes women who did not live in the Karabakh region at the time of the survey, but who (i) self-identified as
IDP/refugee in the survey or (ii) whose husbands did. Karabakh residents include women who never migrated
from the Karabakh region. The sample is restricted to women exposed to the risk of first birth in calendar years
1992–2006. p-Values are reported for tests of difference in means or proportions.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS.
groups are also noteworthy. While the least educated group is the Karabakh
residents, the differences with the nonexposed is not large and IDP/refugees
are the most educated. Nonetheless, differences are not statistically signif-
icant. Furthermore, the Soviet legacy of high literacy is visible across all
subgroups, with only 2 percent of women in the overall sample reporting
not having completed primary schooling.
ORSOLA TORRISI 515
Taken alone, Table 1 suggests only modest conflict-related differences
in socioeconomic and fertility background. However, these numbers have
limited informative power. The next section thus presents the methods and
analytical strategies used to investigate more in detail fertility trends and
their relationship with armed conflict in Azerbaijan.
Methods
The first aim of this study is to retrace Azerbaijan’s fertility history and un-
derstand the mechanisms driving changes; for example, whether they con-
form more to a “stopping-sooner” or a “starting-later” behavior. Data from
the AZ-DHS can be used to reconstruct annual fertility rates for the 15 years
before the survey (Schoumaker 2013). For a woman aged x,18 in calendar




where Bx,t represents the number of births in year t to women aged x and
Wx,t is the exposure to risk of giving a birth at age x during year t calculated
in women-years. Standard errors, derived using the delta method, are then
used to compute the 95 percent confidence intervals for Fx,t (Schoumaker
2013; Pullum 2006). Yearly estimates of total fertility (TFR) are calculated
for all women, for conflict-exposed and nonexposed women. I also com-
pute total marital fertility rates (TMFR) for comparative purposes. Next, to
understand the nature of fertility changes, I calculate period parity-specific
changes using parity progression ratios (PPRs). This measure presents the
proportion of womenwho have j child in the years preceding the index year
and go on (or “progress”) to have j+1 child(ren) in the index year (Hinde
1998). PPRs are constructed using the synthetic cohort method (SCM) (Ni
Bhrolchàin 1987).19 The risk of selection due to censoring inherent to the
SCM is hereminimized as changes in this incremental aspect of childbearing
are explored over a relatively limited time frame—that is, 1991–2005.
The second aim of the paper is to investigate how conflict exposure
may be associated with changes in fertility, and in particular with the tran-
sition to the first, second, and third birth. To do so, I use an event-history
approach which allows establishing general and conflict-specific trends in
the outcomes of interest over time. Specifically, the model chosen to ana-
lyze the three transitions is a discrete-time logit model accounting for un-
observed heterogeneity (“frailty”) at the woman-level (Allison 1982). In its






= αDt,i + βXi + γPt,i + υi (2)
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where π t,i is the probability for woman i of experiencing the event during
interval t, provided that she has not yet experienced it. Dt,i is a vector of
functions of the cumulative duration by interval t with coefficients α. This
is specified by breaking the hazard function into k categories (e.g., <2 years,
3–6 years, and so on) during which the risk of the outcome of interest is as-
sumed constant for women with the same pattern of covariates. The du-
ration categories were chosen to best describe the shape of the baseline
hazard which changes quickly at the beginning of the interval (e.g., after
marriage in the case of the transition to the first birth) and then diminishes
less rapidly. Time is measured in years, as common in fertility analyses. The
choice of this timescale (years instead of months) is also guided by the fact
that interest lies in the effect of macrolevel political changes which, even
in rapidly transforming conflict settings like independent Azerbaijan, un-
fold gradually over time (Agadjanian, Dommaraju, and Glick 2008). Xi is
a set of time-invariant individual-level covariates with coefficients β and
Pt,i is a vector of dummy variables representing calendar year effects. These
are time-varying since women are exposed differently to historical periods
as they move forward through the risk of giving birth. To avoid any time-
ordering problem and more accurately test whether conflict exposure was
associated with fertility outcomes, analyses start in calendar year 1992. This
allows taking into account the gestation period for births conceived in the
earliest phases of the conflict and making sure that births happened before
the conflict broke out do not affect the estimates.20
The main predictors of interest are thus calendar year and the conflict
exposure variable (in its “broad” definition, as interest lies not just in the
woman’s experience, but that of the household as a whole as explained
above), as well as the interaction between the two. For second and third
births, I also include a variable capturing the relation with experience of
child death during key conflict years (1992–1995) as a way to explore the
replacement mechanism. This latter predictor is coded as a dummy variable
where 1 indicates that the previous child died during conflict years and
before the birth of the ith child under study to ensure that the events are
in the correct chronological order. Other variables included in the Xi vector
are age at marriage specified as linear and quadratic (age at second and third
births for following births), residence type (urban or rural), and education.
This latter is constructed as a three-level variable following Agadjanian,
Dommaraju, and Glick (2008) and reflecting the Soviet education system:
general secondary or lower; vocational, alternatively known as specialized
secondary (tekhnikum in Russian), and higher. In the second and third birth
models, I further add sex of the previous child(/ren) in order to account
for possible sex selective practices, which are known to be widespread
in Azerbaijan (Meslé, Vallin, and Badurashvili 2005; Yüksel-Kaptanoglu
et al. 2014). Models are estimated for the sample of all women as well as
for subsamples of women exposed or nonexposed to violence to explore
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whether the effect of certain covariate, for example, child death, varied
within groups with different exposure to the conflict.
Lastly, υ i represents the woman-specific “frailty” term, which accounts
for unobserved heterogeneity attributable to individual time-invariant un-
known risk factors. For each individual, υ i represents a set of unmeasured
characteristics randomly drawn from a normal distribution with variance
σ 2υ (Steele 2008).21 This is interpreted as the residual variance between
women that is due to unmeasured time-invariant attributes. Including
woman-specific unobserved individual heterogeneity in the study of tran-
sitions to the ith birth is important because omitting some unobservable
variables22 or simply ignoring the heterogeneity existing in women’s bio-
logical capacity of conceiving, can lead to a dynamic selection process that
may produce incorrect hazard estimates and a misleading estimation of
duration dependence (Jenkins 1995). In the case of transitions to the next
birth, this is because women have different childbearing intensities: those
with high intensities (i.e., those whose unobserved characteristics make
them at “high-risk”) have shorter durations and are selected out of the
sample, leaving those with low intensities (“low-risk”) behind. This in turn
implies that at higher duration, the sample at risk is increasingly composed
of women whose unobservable characteristics make them unlikely to ex-
perience the event of interest and thus more “robust” against childbearing
than the rest. Unobserved heterogeneity is therefore included to avoid the
emergence of such model specification issues.
Given that childbearing outside wedlock is particularly rare in Azer-
baijan and that most women marry by their early 20s, women aged 16+23
are observed from their date of marriage until the date of first birth or inter-
view for the first transition,24 whichever comes first. Those who gave birth
before entering into official union are thus excluded from the analyses (0.80
percent, n = 43). For second and third births, exposure starts 7 months af-
ter the previous birth to allow for the effects of lactational amenorrhea.25
Women who have not experienced these events at interview time are right-
censored.
As robustness checks, the paper also explores differences in transition
to birth by using the “narrow” definition of conflict and by separating out
the effects of being a refugee/IDP and a Karabakh resident. Finally, it is im-
portant to note that all the estimates reported in this paper are based on a
sample of survivors residing in Azerbaijan in 2006. Those who died during
the conflict or migrated outside the country are therefore excluded. Most of
movements of the ethnic Azerbaijani (“titular”) population occurring dur-
ing conflict years were internal to Azerbaijan, predominantly in the form
of displacement. International migration concerned more the emigration of
Russians in the postindependence years and of Armenians (Aliyev 2006).
Hence, as interest lies in the titular population, outward migration should
not represent a major issue.
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FIGURE 3 Total fertility rate and total marital fertility rate, Azerbaijan
1991–2005
NOTE: Shaded area highlights key conflict years.
SOURCE: TransMonEE vital registration data (women aged 15–49), Human Fertility Collection (ODE
Collection) and 2006 AZ-DHS (women aged 16–39).
Retracing fertility trends in postindependence
Azerbaijan
Figure 3 displays trends in TFR for all women in Azerbaijan from inde-
pendence to 2005 as estimated from the AZ-DHS and compared with of-
ficial estimates from vital registration26 and fertility estimates as compiled
by the Human Fertility Collection (HFC) ODE database27 (MPIDR and VID
2018). In general, sources provide considerable evidence of period fertility
decline since independence in 1991, although vital registration and survey
estimates converge only at the start of the new century, suggesting under-
registration of birth in the postindependence and conflict years. A small,
but noteworthy, opposite mismatch between these two sources appears in
the past years of observation, with the latter reporting higher fertility than
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survey estimates. This could be due to increased fertility rates in women
aged 35–49, whose fertility is only partially captured by estimates calculated
retrospectively from the AZ-DHS (see Figure 6), between 2003 and 2005.28
The somewhat lower estimates provided by the HFC-ODE database for the
first part of the new century are likely to be the result of the methodology
used to calculate such rates. Despite these small differences, sources follow
a similar trend.
Overall, the number of children per woman moved from above 3 in
1992 (as estimated from the AZ-DHS) to below replacement at the start of
the new century (1.75 in 2001, 95 percent CI 1.56–1.93) with then TFR
plateauing at around two children per woman in the most recent observa-
tion years. The declining trend in TFR of the 1990s is visibly mirrored in
annual estimates of TMFR (Figure 3). In the postindependence years and
at least until the start of the new century, period marital fertility rates al-
most halved, closely following the behavior of overall fertility. In general,
the decline is most evident between 1992 and 1996, reflecting lower con-
ceptions during years marked by conflict and economic downturn. With the
start of the new millennium marital fertility experienced a larger increase
than TFR, but then similarly stabilized at around 4.5 children per married
woman towards the end of the observation period.
PPRs, presented in Figure 4 using 3-year moving averages to smooth
annual fluctuations, show that the drop in fertility was primarily the re-
sult of declines in third-order fertility and, only a decade after the fall of
the USSR and onset of the Karabakh conflict, to delayed first birth. In de-
tail, the proportion of women who moved from having no to one child
after marriage remained practically unchanged during the conflict period
and only showed a declining tendency at the beginning of the new century.
Similarly, the proportion of women who continued to have a second birth
remained more or less constant over the 1990s and early 2000s, with except
for some decline during conflict years. Third-order progression instead was
characterized by a more substantial drop: the proportion of women transi-
tioning to the third parity almost halved between the early independence
years and 2005. Falls occurred in all years, although most of the decline in
progression to the third birth can be observed from 1992 to 1996 (conflict
years) and again from 1999 to 2002. This therefore suggests that, at least ini-
tially, the major characterizing force for fertility declines in Azerbaijan was
that of a “stopping-sooner” behavior in years characterized by deteriorating
economic conditions and conflict violence. This fast-declining tendency to
have a third birth, coupled with the fact that, at least until 2002, virtually
all women in Azerbaijan had a first birth after marriage (about 92 percent)
sets up parity two as the key birth-decision in this context.
To explore more in detail whether conflict violence had any effect on
fertility, I estimated TFR from the AZ-DHS for exposed and nonexposed
women (Figure 5). First, while both groups experienced an overall decline
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FIGURE 4 Parity progression ratios, Azerbaijan 1991–2005
NOTE: 3-year moving averages. Shaded area highlights key conflict years.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS (ever married women).
in fertility, the drop during peak conflict years is more visible and contin-
uous for exposed women. For this group, the decline extended to 1997,
when the TFR point estimate dipped below the replacement level. This was
largely the result of declining rate among adolescent and young adult ex-
posed women (Figure 6).29 For instance, fertility dropped from about 224
children per 1,000 exposed women aged 20–24 in 1992 to 150 in 1996.
Rates for the nonexposed declined at all ages (except for adolescent), but
less rapidly for young adults, suggesting age-related different responses in
times of violence and dire economic conditions. After 1997, trends for the
exposed become more erratic. While the lowest estimated TFR value for
both groups was in 2001 (about 1.65 children per woman), since then there
is evidence of compensatory rises among the more conflict-exposed, adult
women in particular. Nonetheless, confidence intervals for the two groups
overlap in all years, indicating no significant differences in total fertility dur-
ing the studied period.
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FIGURE 5 Total fertility rate by conflict exposure, Azerbaijan 1991–2005
NOTE: Exposed women are defined according to the broad definition. This includes women who (i) always
resided in Karabakh, (ii) self-identify as refugees from Armenia/IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh or (iii) were not
refugees or IDPs, but whose husbands were.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS (women aged 16–39).
Armed conflict and childbearing transitions
The previous section showed that since 1991 Azerbaijan experienced a
fertility decline at the aggregate level, engineered predominantly via a
“stopping-sooner” behavior at parity three and incipient first birth post-
ponement towards the end of the observation period. An established
falling propensity to have a third birth, accompanied by almost universal
transition to motherhood, leads to the hypothesis that—if the relationship
between conflict and fertility indeed differs by parity—then the influence
of violence should be strongest on the decision to transition to the second
birth in this context. As aggregate measures of fertility computed for long
periods of time though may not be robust enough to detect the underlying
trend of the decline and to fully capture the effects of conflict at different
birth orders, I next assess this hypothesis with event history analyses.
Table 2 summarizes themain results of discrete-time logitmodels for all
transitions estimated for three sample groups: all women, conflict-exposed
women, and nonexposed women, defined as per the “broad” definition of
conflict exposure.30 Each transition is discussed separately in the following
subsections.
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FIGURE 6 Age-specific fertility rates by conflict exposure, Azerbaijan
1991–2005
NOTE: 3-year moving averages. Exposed women are defined according to the ‘broad’ definition. This includes
women who (i) always resided in Karabakh, (ii) self-identify as refugees from Armenia/IDPs from
Nagorno-Karabakh or (iii) were not refugees or IDPs, but whose husbands were. Shaded area highlights key
conflict years.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS (women aged 16–39).
Transition from marriage to first birth
The analysis starts by presenting the odds ratios for the transition to the first
birth after marriage. Results from the full all women sample model (Table 2,
Panel A, Column a) show that, although the odds of having a first birth
after marriage in any given year is about 14 percent higher for women ex-
posed to conflict, the difference with nonexposed women is not statistically
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significant. As it could be expected from populations where the fertility
transition is realized via reductions at high parities, there is no evidence of
decline in the risk of first birth across calendar years relative to 1992—the
year when conflict hostilities erupted in full. Rather, year effects point
towards significant increases, particularly in the early postconflict period as
well as in the early 2000s. For instance, the odds of transitioning to a first
birth in 1998 and 2002 for women (with the same unobserved characteris-
tics) are, respectively, almost three times and 76 percent higher than in 1992
(Column a). These results suggest that, at least until the first years of the
new century, motherhood was still a universal phenomenon in Azerbaijan.
To explore whether year effects then differed within each conflict group, I
first estimate models for each conflict subsample separately (Columns b and
c). Results show increases in first birth probability in both exposed and non-
exposed subgroups in the early conflict and postconflict years. However,
these positive associations are significant only within the group of nonex-
posed women. In the subsample of women exposed to conflict hostilities,
the positive increase is only observed in 1998. Lastly, to further explore the
impact of conflict in specific tumultuous years, I reestimated the all-women
sample model now adding an interaction term between calendar years and
the conflict exposure variable (see Table A1, Column d in online Appendix
A containing supplementary material). The results of the interaction can be
best visualized in Figure 7. Overall, although the trend for the most affected
by the hostilities is more erratic and characterized by wider fluctuations, the
groups largely follow a similar pattern, indicating no significant difference
in the association with calendar year by conflict exposure, neither during
the conflict period nor in the posttruce years. Interestingly, by the end of
the observation period, first birth probabilities for the more exposed are
similar to those observed at conflict onset and very close to those of the
nonexposed.
With regard to the other variables included in the models, the risk of
first birth is only significantly associated with age at marriage, and its effect
is curvilinear: the odds of experiencing a first birth increase substantially
to then decline as marital age increases. By contrast, place of residence or
education have no association with the risk of transitioning to the first birth
(for results of all covariates, see Table A1 in Appendix A).
In brief, being exposed to conflict does not appear to influence the
probability of having a first birth after marriage. Conversely, what emerges
is a trend of unchallenged universal motherhood in Azerbaijan that per-
sisted at least until the start of the new century. Only towards the end of
the observation period there are mild indications of incipient first birth
postponement and convergence in probability between women exposed
differently to the conflict.
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TABLE 2 Odds ratios of first, second, and third birth, ever married women by
conflict status
All women Nonexposed Exposed
Panel A: First birth conflict exposure (ref: no)
Yes 1.145
Calendar year (ref: 1992)
1993 1.683* 1.626* 2.692
1994 1.890** 1.904** 2.370
1995 1.673 1.569 3.954
1996 1.423 1.574 1.054
1997 2.199** 2.195* 3.048
1998 2.800*** 2.848** 3.872*
1999 1.468 1.552 1.922
2000 1.197 1.192 1.569
2001 1.238 1.110 2.591
2002 1.765* 1.698 2.830
2003 1.712 1.528 4.648
2004 1.102 1.148 1.093
2005 0.170*** 0.133*** 0.568
σu
2 2.642 3.179 1.074
Nw,y 5349 4650 699
Panel B: Second birth
Conflict exposure (ref: no)
Yes 1.417***
Calendar year (ref: 1992)
1993 0.818 0.851 1.052*
1994 0.847 0.822 1.064*
1995 0.682* 0.705* 0.425
1996 0.654* 0.689* 0.422
1997 0.623* 0.660* 0.414
1998 0.670* 0.701* 0.521
1999 0.705* 0.709 0.717
2000 0.433*** 0.464*** 0.274*
2001 0.562** 0.576** 0.431
2002 0.619* 0.620* 0.549
2003 0.608** 0.605** 0.608
2004 0.692 0.694 0.654
2005 0.107*** 0.100*** 0.134**
First child died during conflict years (ref: no)
Yes 2.378* 0.435 6.715***
σ u
2 0.149 0.100 0.486
Nw,y 8630 7545 1085
Panel C: Third birth
Conflict exposure (ref: no)
Yes 0.855




All women Nonexposed Exposed
1993 1.041 1.105 0.699
1994 0.743 0.802 0.439
1995 0.738 0.795 0.452
1996 0.877 0.976 0.418*
1997 0.703 0.767 0.386
1998 0.764 0.826 0.461
1999 0.548** 0.623 0.212*
2000 0.633* 0.719 0.256*
2001 0.452*** 0.534** 0.135**
2002 0.544** 0.595* 0.306*
2003 0.669 0.760 0.291*
2004 0.661* 0.675 0.541
2005 0.304*** 0.300*** 0.311*
Second child died during conflict years (ref: no)
Yes 8.330*** 7.841*** 20.032***
σu
2 0.014 0.031 0.006
Nw,y 19730 17182 2548
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
NOTES: All regressions control for time since start of exposure (<2, 3–6, 7–10, 11+ years), education
(secondary or less, secondary-special, higher), residence type (urban, rural), age at marriage (linear and
squared) for first birth, age at first birth and at second birth, sex of the previous child for second and third birth,
respectively. Nw,y: number of years of exposure in total analysis period for sampled women. Regressions are all
specified with frailty terms at the woman level. Subjects enter analysis at date of marriage for first birth and 7
months after the previous birth for subsequent births. Extended tables are reported in Appendix A.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS. Columns represent exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios).
Transition from first to second birth
Panel B in Table 2 presents the main odds ratios from models predicting
the transition from a first to a second birth for the all-women sample,
for exposed and nonexposed conflict women separately. An overall time-
independent conflict-exposure difference in the probability of a second
birth is visible and is statistically significant in the all women sample model
(Column a). In particular, for women with the same unobserved char-
acteristics, the odds of experiencing a second birth are 42 percent higher
for respondents exposed to violence than for those who were not directly
affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Effect size remains large and
significant in all model specifications (see Table A2 in Appendix A) as well
as when controlling for regional differences in fertility.31 Furthermore, all
things equal, the odds of transitioning to a second birth are about 2.38 times
higher if women experienced child death during key conflict years. When
models are estimated for exposed and nonexposed women individually,
I observe that the loss of a child during conflict years significantly and
substantially affected the probability of having a second birth (about 6.7
times higher) in the group of exposed women only, providing indications
of replacement of children lost during conflict periods.
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FIGURE 7 Predicted probabilities of first birth by conflict exposure
interacted with calendar year
SOURCE: As for Table A1. Other predictors are set to their mean values. Shaded area highlights key conflict
years.
Differently from the transition to first birth, significant declines in the
probability of a second birth are visible in the Azerbaijani population as
a whole soon after independence. Yet, models for each conflict subgroup
(Panel B, Column b and c) show some differences in the effect of calen-
dar period, especially in years characterized by violence: although the odds
of transitioning to the second birth compared to 1992 declined in each year
following independence in the all women sample, the conflict-specific mod-
els show that in practice the drop in second birth probability was significant
among the nonexposed to violence only. This group experienced a general
smoother and essentially continuous downward trend. In contrast, a 5–6
percent increase in risk is observed for the more exposed in 1993–1994,
reflecting higher conceptions and births at the beginning and during the
full-scale conflict. Hence, to further test period differences between conflict-
exposed and nonexposedwomen, I reestimate the all-women samplemodel
with an interaction between the two variables (Table A2, Column d in Ap-
pendix A). Figure 8 graphically presents the results in the probability metric.
Again, there is evidence of significant increases in the probability of tran-
sitioning to the second birth in years characterized by violent conflict for
women exposed to such fighting. In the posttruce years (1994 onwards),
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FIGURE 8 Predicted probabilities of second birth by conflict exposure
interacted with calendar year
SOURCE: As for Table A2, Column d in Appendix A. Other predictors are set to their mean values. Shaded area
highlights key conflict years. Note that the y-axis tops at 0.60.
the difference in year effects vanishes, although in the early 2000s there is
a steady surge in second birth probability across both conflict groups, pos-
sibly more marked for the exposed.
As for other covariates, there are significant negative associations be-
tween high education and age at first birth and the probability of progressing
to a second birth (see Table A2 in Appendix A). Rural background is a strong
predictor in all models, increasing the odds of second birth over urban by
about 62 percent in the all women sample models and by 82 percent in the
conflict-exposed subsample. The sex of the first child is another important
covariate influencing the propensity to have a second child in Azerbaijan:
the odds for women whose first child was female are 8 percent higher than
for women who had a boy. Yet, such effect is only detected among nonex-
posed women, suggesting that patriarchal values more than conflict-related
motives feed the idea of the “added” value of having a son.
Transition from second to third birth
The main results for analyses on the transition to third birth are reported in
Panel C of Table 2. As for the first birth, the risk of having a third child is
not significantly associated with exposure to conflict violence, controlling
for calendar year and other covariates. However, results show that the risk is
eightfold for women who reported experience of child death during conflict
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FIGURE 9 Predicted probabilities of third birth by conflict exposure
interacted with calendar year
SOURCE: As for Table A3, Column d in Appendix A. Other predictors are set to their mean values. Shaded area
highlights key conflict years. Note that the y-axis tops at 0.15.
years, the second proxy used to assess exposure to traumatic conflict-related
events. The impact of child loss during conflict years is strong across all the
models, but is appreciably larger in magnitude for women exposed to con-
flict. Although this is likely to be due to the limited number of second child
deaths occurred in the conflict period (less than 2 percent), it could suggest
replacement- and risk-insurance effects even in contexts where declines in
high-order fertility are the predominant way to engineer the fertility tran-
sition. As observed for the transition to second child, younger age at pre-
vious birth, rural residence, and sex composition of previous offspring are
all significantly and positively associated with the probability of having a
third birth in the Azerbaijani population as a whole and in the nonexposed
group. Except the sex of prior children, these variables correlate, albeit more
mildly, with the risk of transitioning to the third child for exposed women
(see Table A3 in Appendix A).
There are some small, yet noteworthy different temporal trends by
conflict exposure. Over the conflict years, there are no significant period dif-
ferences in the risk of transitioning to the third birth in all groups, although
predicted probabilities from the model with the year-exposure interaction
(Figure 9) show a large decline for more exposed women between 1992 and
1994. In the postconflict years, though, the downward trend becomes sig-
nificant earlier and is more pronounced in this latter group: the likelihood
of a third birth was already about 60 percent lower in 1996 than in 1992 for
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women exposed to the conflict and continued to decline until the first years
of the new century, when it starts to display a rising trend. By contrast, in
the nonexposed group there is evidence of a significant “stopping sooner”-
type of behavior around the early 2000s only, suggesting that most of the
decline for this parity transition had been achieved before conflict onset.32
Alternative measures and robustness checks
To further explore the strength of the above results, I estimate the all-
women sample model for all three transitions using the alternative “nar-
row” definition of conflict exposure. Results remain practically unchanged
when only women who were directly affected by conflict violence are in-
cluded in the models as “exposed” (see Table B1 in Appendix B).33
A dichotomous identification of conflict exposure provides informa-
tion on the association with the transition of interest. However, a binary
measure of this kind may mask different responses within groups that have
been diversely affected by conflict violence. For instance, women who re-
side in the conflict-affected districts of Karabakh and who, thus, decided
not to migrate, may have different fertility responses than refugees or IDP
women, who experienced the stress of forced migration, but may have also
relocated in more secure zones, farther away from core conflict areas. For
this reason, models for all the three transitions were estimated by disaggre-
gated conflict status, that is for nonexposed women, never migrant women
residing in the Karabakh region and for IDP/refugee women who were
forced to abandon their homes due to conflict. Tables A4, A5, and A6 in
Appendix A report the results for the three transitions.
The estimated odds ratios suggest that indeed different behaviors have
been at play across different conflict subgroups. As it already emerged in
previous models, the probability of a second birth is much higher (between
41 and 45 percent higher) for the conflict groups as compared to the non-
exposed population. This remains true when the year/exposure interaction
is included in the model (see Table 5, Column b). Again, the effect of partic-
ularly tumultuous years (e.g., 1992–1994) on the transition to the second
birth is different for both refugee/IDP and Karabakh residents as compared
to nonexposed. When models are estimated separately for each conflict
group subsample to explore whether the relationships with covariates varies
by conflict exposure, I observed that replacement effects for the first chil-
dren died during conflict years are only visible in the IDP/refugee subgroup.
Similar to models using a dichotomous definition of conflict exposure, the
probability of transitioning to the third child does not vary between dif-
ferent conflict subgroups and the nonaffected population, but the effect of
child loss is sizable in the subsample of IDP/refugees. Notably and differ-
ently from before, the odds of having a first birth are significantly higher
(about 42 percent) for women living in the Karabakh region compared to
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nonaffected women. For IDP or refugee women, such risk at any given time
is not different from that of the nonexposed. Hence, a binary definition
hides some differences in relationship between fertility and exposure to
conflict conditions, in a way that highlights how a more direct and con-
tinuous exposure, not mediated by migration, can influence households’
decisions on the first birth already.
Limitations
Examining the timing of different parities and its relationship with conflict
violence using retrospective data, as this paper does, bears a number of lim-
itations. First, the study of the transition from parity j to j+ 1 introduces the
problem of selectivity in that each transition can be analyzed only for those
women who have already reached parity j (or marriage) at the time of the
survey. I sought to tackle such selectivity issue as much as possible by con-
trolling for theoretically relevant socioeconomic and demographic covari-
ates as well as by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity among women.
Another similar issue that could affect fertility estimates relates to the oc-
currence of selective outward migration before survey implementation. As
noted earlier, however, international emigration from Azerbaijan following
the collapse of the USSR concerned principally ethnic Russians and Arme-
nians (Aliyev 2006), who are not the focus of this study. More generally,
assessments and simulations have also shown that the bias in retrospec-
tive estimations of fertility resulting from selective migration tends to small
(Abbasi-Shavazi 1997; Spoorenberg 2014).
Second, for as much as birth histories reveal historical trends in fer-
tility, DHS data do not permit a more detailed examination of changes in
the socioeconomic position and conflict status of women over time, and
in particular during periods of wide social turbulence due to conflict and
economic restructuring. This makes it difficult to disentangle the effects on
childbearing outcomes of conflict-caused economic dislocation and of the
economic downturn due to the collapse of the USSR. Nonetheless, informa-
tion on conflict-related migration patterns of individuals, as well as detailed
data on death of children, in the survey served to identify those groups
that, on top of difficulties caused by the collapse of the USSR, have also
endured the harsh consequences of conflict violence such as forced migra-
tion. Hence, the estimates presented here provide some evidence that the
conflict itself, above and beyond economic crisis alone, is associated with
fertility outcomes in Azerbaijan.
Lastly, seeking to understand the different pathways through which
conflict is associated with childbearing outcomes by looking at different
population subgroups inevitably exposes the research findings to possible
estimation issues due to small sample size. Unfortunately, this also narrows
the amount of sub- and fine-grained analyses I am able to perform. It would
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have been interesting, for instance, to create a separate indicator and esti-
mates for the group of women who were not IDP/refugees themselves, but
whowere married to one and explore differences for each transition specific
to this subgroup; equally, to differentiate the effects for refugees who came
to Azerbaijan at different stages of the conflict. Yet, the small sample size—
which further reduces at each transition—and lack of detailed migration
histories preclude sensible estimations of this kind. More broadly, although
the effect size on the second birth is large and results are consistent in the
robustness checks, this constraint highlights one of the reasons why con-
flict influences on fertility and driving mechanisms are scarcely studied at
the microlevel. More efforts are required to develop new or expand existing
survey tools (e.g., simple oversampling of conflict-exposed populations and
wider number of conflict-related questions in questionnaires) that can help
researchers better identify those exposed to violence as well as the type of
violence they experienced (Brück et al. 2016).
Discussion and conclusion
This study is the first to provide a detailed account of fertility changes
in Azerbaijan since independence and to directly investigate the associa-
tion between armed conflict and childbearing outcomes in the post-Soviet
world. Trend analyses showed that, after the collapse of the USSR and the
start of the full-scale conflict with Armenia, TFR declined for all women,
particularly as a result of falling progression to the third birth. Declining
rates were evident across all age categories and, in the early postindepen-
dence years, visibly in young adult conflict-affected women. This provides
an indication of the type of fertility changes Azerbaijan has undergone over
time in its general population, but also in various subgroups, and can guide
prediction on future population developments and comparisons with anal-
ogous, but more studied countries in the former USSR space.
The finding of a general “stopping-sooner” behavior in the early
postindependence years mirrors what has been found in much of the
literature on fertility changes in countries that experienced harsh economic
downturns following the Soviet breakdown. In Armenia and in ex-Soviet
Central Asian republics, for instance, the early 1990s were characterized,
as well, by fertility declines engineered via limitation of higher order
births rather than birth postponement (Agadjanian 1999; Agadjanian and
Makarova 2003; Clifford, Falkingham, and Hinde 2010; Billingsley 2011).
In the subsequent decades, with economic recovery and the evolution of
nation-building processes, patterns of first birth postponement began to
emerge in these settings (Billingsley 2010; Spoorenberg 2013; Billingsley
and Duntava 2017). Net of conflict effects, this biphasic model of fertility
decline—that is, reductions driven by birth limitation at high parities
during periods of crisis and by postponement of family events once the
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economy develops (Lerch 2018)—may also apply at the national level to
Azerbaijan. My analyses point towards this direction. After dipping below
two children per woman, between 2002 and 2005—when Azerbaijan’s
economy expanded and experienced steady trade surpluses (World Bank
2014)—period fertility stabilized around the replacement level with starting
signs of slower progression to parity one in the general population. Any
discussion on recent patterns of fertility in Azerbaijan is, however, only
speculative with the data at hand. More up-to-date microlevel information
than the survey data used in this paper are required to further explore the
hypothesis of a biphasic model of fertility transition, understand its current
underlying mechanisms, and, importantly, investigate how they play out
among Azerbaijan’s various conflict subgroups.
Beyond understanding Azerbaijan’s postindependence fertility trajec-
tories, I also examined in greater depth the relationship between the ob-
served trends and women’s exposure to conflict violence resulting from the
Nagorno-Karabakh war. Most studies on conflict and fertility limit the anal-
yses to the first birth or approach the relationship more generally by look-
ing at children ever born or at other aggregate measures of fertility without
considering the timing of such births (Nepal, Halla, and Stillman 2018). By
contrast, I addressed the possibility that the effects of political violence and
tensions vary at different birth orders depending on the country’s stage in
the fertility transition. This hypothesis suggests that conflict and related un-
certainty will have a stronger effect on the decision to transition to the aver-
age parity level in the population. In the Azerbaijani context—characterized
by almost universal motherhood and by limitation at high orders—that is
the second birth.
The main findings of this research support this hypothesis. While
the probability of transitioning to the first and third birth did not differ
between those affected and those not exposed to conflict violence, visible
differences emerged for the transition to second birth. Women who have
been exposed to conflict violence—whether residents in Karabakh, IDPs or
refugees—have around 42 percent higher chances of having a second child
than nonexposed ones. This probability was also larger in highly violent
years for conflict-affected women, while for the Azerbaijani population
as a whole, it began to decline in the early postindependence period. This
result suggests that different behaviors have been in place: on the one side
the nonaffected population responded to parlous economic conditions by
continuously lowering second-order fertility; by contrast, those who were
also affected by political violence did the opposite in highly violent years or
recuperated their second births as conditions became more stable.
From a theoretical point of view, this finding resonates with the “fertil-
ity promotion” hypothesis (Fargues 2000; Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, and
Hosseini-Chavoshi 2009; Schindler and Brück 2011). In a context where
one-child families are becoming slowly, but progressively, more prevalent,
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several factors could explain this higher propensity of conflict-affected
women to have children. The first relates to risk-insurance mechanisms.
Enlarging household size could represent an intentional coping strategy
for conflict-affected families, not only in the long-term, when grown up
children can provide additional resources to the family nucleus through,
for instance, paid work. If economic assistance and support is provided to
conflict-affected groups by national and/or international authorities, there
might also be short-term incentives to increase household size. The govern-
ment of Azerbaijan has for long devoted an important share of its GDP to
its displaced population and set up IDP-specific social transfers like exemp-
tions fromutility payments, monthly allocations for basic foodstuffs, and de-
duced income tax rate (World Bank 2010; Gureyeva-Aliyeva and Huseynov
2011).34 Although there are no IDP/refugee-specific social transfers that can
be directly linked to fertility and the amounts of birth grants and childcare
benefits available to the Azerbaijani population as a whole are relatively
small,35 it is possible that some of these government support schemes exert
some influence over IDP/refugees’ propensity to have children, especially
if they also struggle with poverty. Risk-insurance mechanisms might also
well apply at the macrolevel: in a conflict where warring groups base terri-
torial legitimacy on population size, as in the Nagorno-Karabakh case, the
perceived need to keep a demographic balance with the opposing faction at
the group-level could explain the observed higher risk for conflict-affected
women, and particularly for Karabakh residents.
A second plausible mechanism stems from the finding that experienc-
ing child loss during conflict years is strongly and positively associated with
higher fertility, irrespective of parity level.36 This is consistent with child
replacement effects and echoes results from other countries experiencing
economic- and violence-related crises (Verwimp and van Bavel 2005;
Schindler and Brück 2011). I find that this occurs independent of the sex of
previous births. By contrast, the sex of prior children in itself is only influen-
tial for the transition to the next birth among nonaffected women. In Azer-
baijan, where levels of sex ratio at birth have been historically high (Meslé,
Vallin, and Badurashvili 2005; Guilmoto 2009; Duthé et al. 2012; Yüksel-
Kaptanoglu et al. 2014), this could indicate that the “added” value of having
a son results more from patrilineal societal structures and patriarchal values
than from shared feelings of external threat to group survival or conflict-
related motives (Das Gupta and Shuzhuo 1999; Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald,
and Hosseini-Chavoshi 2009; Mavisakalyan and Minasyan 2018).
A third and related element that emerges from the analyses is that
people’s experience of conflict violence matters for their fertility responses
(Kraehnert et al. 2019). This is evident not only from the higher hazards
of second and third births for women who had the traumatic experience
of child death during conflict years; also the finding of higher first-order
fertility in the nonmigrant group of Karabakh women only points towards
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this idea of a differential response depending on one’s experience—whether
direct and immediate or indirect and more chronic—of conflict-related un-
certainty and stressors. Further, this could signal disruptive effects of forced
migration on the early childbearing outcomes of women who flee from
Karabakh as well as their possible assimilation to the behavior of the nonaf-
fected population as they resettled away from the conflict zones. Although
the fertility patterns of IDPs have rarely been studied (perhaps because of
the assumption of relatively homogeneous fertility trends within countries),
findings from studies on refugee populations (Williams et al. 2013) and vol-
untary internal migrants (Kulu 2005; Daudin, Frank, and Rapoport 2019)
suggestmore-or-less rapid assimilation to the average levels of fertility of the
receiving population. Hence, there is reason to suppose that similar long-
run patterns have emerged among IDPs in Azerbaijan.
The role of preconflict norms and preexisting characteristics of each
population subgroups is also likely to affect the kind and extent of their fer-
tility responses and should thus not be ignored. In the case of Azerbaijan,
the prewar predominantly rural character of women then exposed to the
conflict37 could have played a role and partially explain the higher over-
all childbearing risk of this group. Equally, another relevant and linked as-
pect that could account for the observed differences concerns the degree to
which family planning resources and reproductive health services were ac-
cessible and available before, during and after the hostilities to vulnerable,
conflict-affectedwomen, particularly in rural areas (Verwimp and van Bavel
2005). If basic, perhaps already limited, reproductive health services are dis-
rupted or become difficult to obtain as a result of conflict, women may see
their access to adequate family planning methods and related knowledge,
including modern contraception and safe abortions, sharply curtailed in a
situation of heightened threats (McGinn 2000; McGinn et al. 2011). This in
turn can translate into higher fertility, at least in the short term when dislo-
cation occurs, and humanitarian assistance is not yet fully in place. The fact
that higher risk of a second birth for conflict-exposed women was observed
particularly in the first two years of violence may be an indication of this
lack of appropriate reproductive healthcare provision.
Besides feeding the theoretical debate on the mechanisms linking con-
flict and fertility, these findings concern policymakers: in a context where
fertility has been oscillating around the replacement level, if households
more affected by violence are also at a less advanced stage in the fertility
transition, ceteris paribus, their size and number relative to the nonexposed
is going to increase with time, and their needs are going to become in-
creasingly pressing. This highlights the importance of ensuring safe access to
and availability of reproductive health services, including family planning,
for conflict-affected and displaced households in times of intense conflict,
but also in the aftermath of sustained fighting. Careful logistical planning
of health services, especially in remote conflict-affected areas and among
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IDP/refugee communities, as well as attention to modern contraception
and family planning counselling are required. In countries like Azerbaijan,
where abortion is widespread and often used as primary method of fertility
regulation, and where it is reportedly difficult for some women and most
men to openly discuss fertility-related issues, such interventions could help
convergence in fertility among conflict-affected and nonaffected groups, in
particular if the higher levels in the former are driven by unintended births.
Overall, however, responsibilities should not be left to national de-
cision makers only. Concerted efforts at the international level to work
towards reaching a credible peace settlement to the conflict in and around
Nagorno-Karabakh should be prioritized. This is important for the de-
velopment of both Azerbaijan and Armenia. More generally in today’s
world, where—as in Nagorno-Karabakh, but also in settings as diverse as
Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Crimea, to limit ourselves to
the post-Soviet sphere—there is a tendency to “freeze” conflicts instead of
finding durable solutions, with the risk that persisting tensions will “thaw”
violently.
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1 For mortality, see, for instance, Grein
et al. (2003) for Angola; Tabeau and Bi-
jak (2005) for Bosnia Herzegovina; Roberts
et al. (2004) for Iraq; Spiegel and Salama
(2000) for Kosovo. For migration, see Ran-
dall (2005) for Mali; Singh et al. (2005) for
Uganda and Sudan; and Williams (2015) for
Nepal.
2 Croatia, Czech Republic, East Ger-
many, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slo-
vakia.
3 Bulgaria, Moldova, and Romania.
4 Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
5 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan.
6 I attempted painstakingly to sort
through the often conflicting, vague, and
relatively limited accounts of this neglected
conflict. The aim of this section is thus to
reconstruct as objectively as possible the his-
torical developments of the conflict with
available information from official sources
and historical documents. In no way, it seeks
to compare human rights violations or atroc-
ities committed by both Armenian and Azer-
baijani forces, nor it seeks to propose any
particular stance in the dispute.
7 In September 1991, the Nagorno-
Karabakh enclave declared its independence
from the Azerbaijani republic. Since then,
the character of the conflict precipitously
changed from a low-intensity conflict fought
predominantly between private militias to a
full-scale interstate conflict (Human Rights
Watch 1992; Zurcher 2007).
8 These include the districts of Agdam,
Fizuli, Gubadly, Kelbajar, Jabrail, Terter, and
Zangilan.
9 Forced migration in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict featured both IDPs and
refugees. The nature of this conflict, with
its contested borders, has inevitably gener-
ated disputed categories and conceptual def-
initions of the terms and between the two
belligerent parties. Nonetheless, the interna-
tional community and Azerbaijan, as a signa-
tory to the 1951 United Nations Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, refer to Azerbaijanis displaced from
Karabakh as IDPs, given that they have not
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crossed an internationally recognized border.
Ethnic Azerbaijanis forced to leave Armenia
were recognized at their arrival in Azerbaijan
as prima facie refugees (UNHCR 2003; 2009).
This group was then granted naturalization
following the adoption of a Law on Citizen-
ship in 1998, which though kept them eligi-
ble to the same benefits provided by the State
to IDPs.
10 An example of this escalation of vio-
lence occurred in April 2016 when hostilities
broke out causing in just three days an es-
timated 150–350 deaths (UCDP-GED 2019;
U.S. Department of State 2016). Skirmishes
also took place in July 2020.
11 To ensure that the data are repre-
sentative according to geographical popu-
lation density and clustering, AZ-DHS pro-
vided sample weights were applied using
Stata’s svyset and related commands in all the
estimations models.
12 For more detailed information on
sample selection, please refer to the offi-
cial report by the State Statistical Committee
of Azerbaijan and Macro International Inc.
(2008).
13 Note that I excluded from the map
events (n = 30) that had no specific location
of occurrence or only provided general geo-
graphical coordinates for Azerbaijan.
14 I would like here to thank one
of the reviewer of this paper who rightly
pointed out that some of refugees from Ar-
menia came to Azerbaijan as a result of
some planned village population exchange
before the full-war erupted (Huseynova and
Rumyantsev 2010). There is though also ev-
idence that refugee flows from Armenia to
Azerbaijan (and vice versa) following violent
push and threats occurred also during the
key conflict years. In general, whether the re-
location fromArmenia occurred in a peaceful
manner or as a result of direct violence, fol-
lowing my conceptualization of conflict ex-
posure, it still represents an indirect conse-
quence of political tensions that likely im-
pacted the lives of those concerned, includ-
ing their decision to have children. For this
reason, refugees from Armenia are coded as
exposed in all model specifications.
15 It was not possible to obtain a list
of the sampled district with names matching
numerical codes due to confidentiality rea-
sons.
16 For instance, the two other eco-
nomic regions registering conflict events,
Aran in Central Azerbaijan and Ganja-
Qazakh (North West), have, respectively, an
area size of about 21,430 and 12,480 km2.
Linking conflict events at the region level
would inevitably and erroneously mask vari-
ation in conflict exposure within these large
geographic units.
17 Note that Table 1 provides descrip-
tive statistics for the sample used in statistical
analyses, which is restricted to ever married
women aged 16+ at the time of the survey
and exposed to the risk of first birth in calen-
dar years 1992–2006 to avoid time-ordering
issues related to conceptions and the onset
of the conflict. In trend analyses, the sam-
ple was limited to women aged 16–39 in
2006 since individuals below age 16 were not
asked the IDP/refugee status question. (See
the Methods section for more.)
18 Given that data are truncated on
older women, rates are here calculated for
births and exposure of women aged 16–39.
As in Azerbaijan most birth occur between
ages 20–35, omitting the small fraction of
births to women aged 40+ should be negligi-
ble. Calculated rates, thus, yield a conserva-
tive estimate of fertility over time.
19 The synthetic cohort method allows
calculating PPRs in the following way:a j =
1− (1− q0)(1− q1)(1− q2) . . . (1− q10)
where aj is the period progression from the
jth birth to the (j +1)th. Accordingly, a0 rep-
resents progression from zero to one child,
a1 from one to two children, and so on. The
set of proportions qx are calculated, as Hinde
(1998) suggests, so that the numerator is
given by the number of women who had jth
birth in year t prior to the current year and
had their (j +1)th birth in the current year.
The denominator is then given by the differ-
ence between the total number of women
who had a jth birth in the year t prior to the
current year and those, among them, who
already had (j +1)th birth before the start of
the current year t.
20 Note that models considering all cal-
endar years (i.e., 1980–2005) were also es-
timated. Results did not change qualitatively
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in terms of significance and size for the con-
flict variables of interest and are available
upon request.
21 Alternatively, a gamma distribution
can be used to model random effects
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity
(Larsen and Vaupel 1993). Yet, this is more
commonly used when time is considered as
continuous. In discrete-time settings, ‘frailty’
terms are typically assumed to be normally
distributed (Steele 2008).
22 Examples of these can be the fre-
quency and time of intercourse, women’s
work status and educational level at each
time point, normative barriers associated
with childlessness, and the thoroughness of
the search for a suitable mate. In the case of
conflict violence, in particular, these covari-
ates are likely to be important as, for instance,
conflict is likely to modify one’s search in
the marriage market (Shemyakina 2013),
increase coital frequency in settings where
war rapes become widespread, or reduce it
due to male conscription or if violence gen-
erates large-scale migration (Buvinic et al.
2013).
23 As said in the section on Data and
measures, women aged 15 years old at the
time of the survey were not asked informa-
tion on their IDP/refugee status and thus
were excluded from the analyses. Only one
observation had to be dropped accordingly.
24 Models estimating the odds of con-
ception in a given year since marriage (first
or second birth) were also estimated by lag-
ging the date of birth of the child back of
9 months. I prefer to report models for the
odds of giving birth as conflict exposure may
not only correlated with conception, but also
with its realization in a live birth. Nonethe-
less, results were largely similar and are avail-
able upon request.
25 According to the AZ-DHS, the aver-
age number of months spent breastfeeding
for the first and second birth in Azerbaijan
is 7.5.
26 Note that official registration data on
age-specific fertility rates from TransMonEE
(2018) for Azerbaijan are available for age 5-
years age groups from age 20 to age 35 only
precluding calculation of the TFR 15–39 for
direct comparison with the survey estimate.
Hence, TransMonEE estimates are here re-
ported for women aged 15–49.
27 The ODE database was developed
by the Institut national d’etudes démo-
graphiques (INED) and its methodology per-
mits to calculate annual TFR using available
data on the total number of live births and
the age structure of female population in
a year. For more information on the ODE
methodology, refer to ODE, Calot, and Sar-
don (2002).
28 Vital registration data from the
TransMonEE database show that age-specific
fertility rates for women aged 35–49 were
8.89 in 2003, 10.38 in 2004, and 10.08 in
2005. A rising trend which might explain
the small mismatch between survey and vi-
tal registration estimates.
29 Note that here trends are shown as
three-year moving averages to smooth an-
nual fluctuations due to sample size, espe-
cially among the exposed group.
30 Extended tables for all the transi-
tions and conflict groups are reported in Ap-
pendix A, Tables A1, A2, and A3. For the all
women sample, each table reports estimates
from a model including only the conflict ex-
posure measure (Column a), only calendar
year (Column b), both variables (i.e., the full
model, Column c), and a model that includes
the interaction between calendar year and
the conflict exposure measure (Column d).
Columns e and f report results for the full
model for the subsamples of women nonex-
posed and exposed to conflict, respectively.
31 Results controlling for regional dif-
ferences in fertility are not shown, but avail-
able upon request.
32 Models estimated using calendar
years 1980–2005 show in fact that the prob-
ability of a third birth declined well before
independence and the conflict with Armenia
in the population of Azerbaijan as a whole,
but also in the two conflict subpopulations.
The drop was much more marked in the
more exposed group as their likelihood of
having a third birth was on the rise and way
higher than that of the nonexposed in the
early 1980s.
33 Note that models including an inter-
action term between calendar year and the
“narrow” conflict exposure measure are not
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shown in the interest of space. Results do not
vary from models using the “broad” defini-
tion and are available upon request.
34 As of 2010, the government of
Azerbaijan spent nearly 3 percent of its
yearly GDP on assistance programs and so-
cial support for IDPs (World Bank 2010,
2015; Gureyeva-Aliyeva and Huseynov
2011).
35 For instance, a lump sum payment
for the birth of a child is paid to all fam-
ilies (about €44.2 in 2008). Equally, bene-
fits for children aged up to 1 year are paid
to all low-income families (about €16.30
per month). IDP school children, however,
receive free education supplies (Asian Devel-
opment Bank 2012; European Commission
2011).
36 While I could not find any indepen-
dent estimate of the number of children di-
rectly killed by the conflict, a detailed re-
port by UNFPA (2015) shows that in the pe-
riod 1990–1994 infant and child mortality
showed an increase at the national level com-
pared to the preceding years. The same re-
port also attempted to draw a subnational
picture of territorial variation in infant and
child mortality. Admittedly though, a variety
of issue of data quality, including incomplete
birth and death registration, make those es-
timates not fully reliable.
37 According to the 1989 USSR Census
(Demoscope 2016) the vast majority of eth-
nic Azerbaijani living in Armenia was con-
centrated in rural areas (77,721 individuals
out of 84,860 lived in rural zones of Ar-
menia). Equally, there is evidence that the
Azerbaijani population living in Nagorno-
Karabakh before the conflict (later displaced)
had a higher rate of population growth, es-
pecially in rural areas of the region (Yam-
skov 1991; USSR Population Statistical Col-
lect 1988).
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Appendix A
TABLE A1 Odds ratios of first birth after marriage, ever married women
All women Nonexposed Exposed
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Conflict exposure (ref: no)
Yes 1.109 1.145 0.500
Time since first birth (ref: <2 years)
3-6 0.269*** 0.254*** 0.254*** 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.329**
7-10 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.067**
11+ 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.041*** 0.002***
Calendar year (ref: 1992)
1993 1.688* 1.683* 1.538 1.626* 2.692
1994 1.894** 1.890** 1.783* 1.904** 2.370
1995 1.678 1.673 1.482 1.569 3.954
1996 1.430 1.423 1.496 1.574 1.054
1997 2.214** 2.199** 2.030* 2.195* 3.048
1998 2.816*** 2.800*** 2.633** 2.848** 3.872*
/…
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TABLE A1 (continued)
All women Nonexposed Exposed
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1999 1.479 1.468 1.468 1.552 1.922
2000 1.205 1.197 1.144 1.192 1.569
2001 1.246 1.238 1.069 1.110 2.591
2002 1.773* 1.765* 1.595 1.698 2.830
2003 1.721 1.712 1.435 1.528 4.648
2004 1.108 1.102 1.077 1.148 1.093
2005 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 0.568
Calendar year (ref: 1992) * Exposure
1993 * Yes 2.471
1994 * Yes 2.011
1995 * Yes 3.632
1996 * Yes 0.900
1997 * Yes 2.464
1998 * Yes 2.218
1999 * Yes 1.418
2000 * Yes 1.894
2001 * Yes 3.783
2002 * Yes 2.927
2003 * Yes 5.440
2004 * Yes 1.505
2005 * Yes 4.679*
Education (ref: secondary or less)
Secondary-special 1.186 1.171 1.167 1.183 1.145 1.365
Higher 1.438 1.510 1.514 1.529 1.402 2.392
Residence type (ref: urban)
Rural 1.118 1.168 1.173 1.173 1.255 0.857
Age at marriage 1.539*** 1.576*** 1.576*** 1.578*** 1.570*** 1.998**
Age at marriage
squared
0.989*** 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.984***
σ u
2 2.488 2.656 2.642 2.737 3.179 1.074
Nw,y 5349 5349 5349 5349 4650 699
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
NOTES: Column (a) presents results for the full-sample model with the conflict indicator and controls only;
Column (b) presents results for the full-sample model with calendar year and controls only; Column (c) presents
results for the full-sample model with all variables; Column (d) adds an interaction term between calendar year
and the exposure variable; Columns (e) and (f) present results for models with all variables for samples of each
conflict group separately. Nw,y: number of years of exposure in total analysis period for sampled women.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS. Exponentiated coefficients.
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TABLE A2 Odds ratios of second birth, ever married women
All women Nonexposed Exposed
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Conflict exposure (ref: no)
Yes 1.392*** 1.417*** 1.741*
Time since first birth (ref: <2 years)
3-6 0.546*** 0.456*** 0.463*** 0.463*** 0.438*** 0.800
7-10 0.123*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.222
11+ 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.010***
Calendar year (ref: 1992)
1993 0.819 0.818 0.818 0.851 1.052*
1994 0.846 0.847 0.833 0.822 1.064*
1995 0.683* 0.682* 0.720* 0.705* 0.425
1996 0.658* 0.654* 0.690* 0.689* 0.422
1997 0.631* 0.623* 0.656* 0.660* 0.414
1998 0.681* 0.670* 0.698* 0.701* 0.521
1999 0.716* 0.705* 0.706 0.709 0.717
2000 0.442*** 0.433*** 0.462*** 0.464*** 0.274*
2001 0.571** 0.562** 0.574** 0.576** 0.431
2002 0.633* 0.619* 0.617* 0.620* 0.549
2003 0.620** 0.608** 0.602** 0.605** 0.608
2004 0.705 0.692 0.691 0.694 0.654
2005 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.134**
Calendar year (ref: 1992) * Exposure
1993 * Yes 1.038*
1994 * Yes 1.219*
1995 * Yes 0.570
1996 * Yes 0.592
1997 * Yes 0.624
1998 * Yes 0.700
1999 * Yes 0.943
2000 * Yes 0.603
2001 * Yes 0.810
2002 * Yes 0.947
2003 * Yes 1.012
2004 * Yes 0.957
2005 * Yes 1.454
Previous child died during conflict years (ref: no)
Yes 3.328* 2.623* 2.378* 2.466* 0.435 6.715***
Sex of first child (ref: male)
Female 1.108* 1.081* 1.081* 1.079* 1.104* 0.990
Education (ref: secondary or less)
Secondary-special 0.901 0.893 0.887 0.886 0.858 1.148
Higher 0.698** 0.752* 0.755* 0.751* 0.780 0.545
Residence type (ref: urban)
Rural 1.652*** 1.586*** 1.617*** 1.615*** 1.585*** 1.820**
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TABLE A2 (continued)
All women Nonexposed Exposed
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Age at first birth 0.937*** 0.940*** 0.940*** 0.940*** 0.938*** 0.943
σ u
2 0.434 0.144 0.149 0.154 0.100 0.486
Nw,y 8630 8630 8630 8630 7545 1085
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
NOTES: Column (a) presents results for the full-sample model with the conflict indicator and controls only;
Column (b) presents results for the full-sample model with calendar year and controls only; Column (c) presents
results for the full-sample model with all variables; Column (d) adds an interaction term between calendar year
and the exposure variable; Columns (e) and (f) present results for models with all variables for samples of each
conflict group separately. Nw,y: number of years of exposure in total analysis period for sampled women.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS. Exponentiated coefficients.
TABLE A3 Odds ratios of third birth, ever married women
All women Nonexposed Exposed
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Conflict exposure (ref: no)
Yes 0.814 0.855 1.560
Time since first birth (ref: <2 years)
3-6 0.628*** 0.593*** 0.594*** 0.592*** 0.578*** 0.747
7-10 0.203*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.197*** 0.171*** 0.516
11+ 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.069***
Calendar year (ref: 1992)
1993 1.043 1.041 1.105 1.105 0.699
1994 0.744 0.743 0.802 0.802 0.439
1995 0.738 0.738 0.793 0.795 0.452
1996 0.877 0.877 0.972 0.976 0.418*
1997 0.704 0.703 0.764 0.767 0.386
1998 0.764 0.764 0.820 0.826 0.461
1999 0.548** 0.548** 0.619 0.623 0.212*
2000 0.631* 0.633* 0.714 0.719 0.256*
2001 0.450*** 0.452*** 0.528** 0.534** 0.135**
2002 0.542** 0.544** 0.587* 0.595* 0.306*
2003 0.666 0.669 0.752 0.76 0.291*
2004 0.656* 0.661* 0.669 0.675 0.541
2005 0.302*** 0.304*** 0.299*** 0.300*** 0.311*
Calendar year (ref: 1992) * Exposure
1993 * Yes 0.647
1994 * Yes 0.543
1995 * Yes 0.569
1996 * Yes 0.416*
1997 * Yes 0.512
1998 * Yes 0.579
1999 * Yes 0.330
2000 * Yes 0.354
2001 * Yes 0.251*




All women Nonexposed Exposed
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
2003 * Yes 0.386
2004 * Yes 0.806
2005 * Yes 0.949
Second child died during conflict years (ref: no)
Yes 14.010*** 8.351*** 8.330*** 8.318*** 7.841*** 20.032***
Sex of previous children (ref: at least one male)
Only female 1.639*** 1.624*** 1.622*** 1.636*** 1.644*** 1.331
Education (ref: secondary or less)
Secondary-special 0.856 0.841 0.848 0.843 0.832 0.914
Higher 0.784 0.793 0.788 0.783 0.727 1.556
Residence type (ref: urban)
Rural 2.087*** 2.041*** 2.028*** 2.022*** 2.056*** 1.733*
Age at second
birth
0.941*** 0.942*** 0.942*** 0.942*** 0.943*** 0.934*
σ u
2 0.353 0.042 0.014 0.004 0.031 0.006
Nw,y 19730 19730 19730 19730 17182 2548
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
NOTES: Column (a) presents results for the full-sample model with the conflict indicator and controls only;
Column (b) presents results for the full-sample model with calendar year and controls only; Column (c) presents
results for the full-sample model with all variables; Column (d) adds an interaction term between calendar year
and the exposure variable; Columns (e) and (f) present results for models with all variables for samples of each
conflict group separately. Nw,y: number of years of exposure in total analysis period for sampled women.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS. Exponentiated coefficients.
TABLE A4 Odds ratios of first birth by extended conflict status, ever married
women
All women Nonexposed IDPs/refugees Karabakh
residents
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)





Time since first birth (ref: <2 years)
3-6 0.254*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.363* 0.198
7-10 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.075* 0.046*
11+ 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.022* 0.001***
Calendar year (ref: 1992)
1993 1.682* 1.544 1.626* 2.623 1.645
1994 1.891** 1.795* 1.904** 2.675 0.607
1995 1.672 1.490 1.569 4.707 0.605
1996 1.424 1.504 1.574 1.008 0.544
1997 2.200** 2.049* 2.195* 3.845 0.243
1998 2.795*** 2.656** 2.848** 4.841* 0.461
1999 1.465 1.477 1.552 2.237 0.728
2000 1.196 1.150 1.192 1.515 0.665
/...
550 ARMED CONFLICT AND THE TIMING OF CHILDBEARING IN AZERBAIJAN
TABLE A4 (continued)
All women Nonexposed IDPs/refugees Karabakh
residents
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
2001 1.238 1.075 1.110 2.269 2.100
2002 1.764* 1.609 1.698 2.624 1.162
2003 1.715 1.448 1.528 4.055 6.494
2004 1.103 1.085 1.148 0.767 3.371
2005 0.169*** 0.137*** 0.133*** 0.563 0.103*
Calendar year (ref: 1992) * IDP/refugee
1993 * Yes 2.779
1994 * Yes 2.726
1995 * Yes 5.219
1996 * Yes 1.042
1997 * Yes 4.413
1998 * Yes 4.022
1999 * Yes 1.573
2000 * Yes 2.229
2001 * Yes 4.213
2002 * Yes 3.821
2003 * Yes 6.019
2004 * Yes 1.436
2005 * Yes 5.670*
Calendar year (ref: 1992) * Karabakh resident
1993 * Yes 1.196
1994 * Yes 0.344
1995 * Yes 0.576
1996 * Yes 0.378
1997 * Yes 0.153*
1998 * Yes 0.231
1999 * Yes 0.489
2000 * Yes 0.624
2001 * Yes 1.572
2002 * Yes 0.667
2003 * Yes 2.608
2004 * Yes 2.182
2005 * Yes 1.401
Education (ref: secondary or less)
Secondary-special 1.163 1.181 1.145 1.772 0.349
Higher 1.504 1.516 1.402 5.133* 0.109*
Residence type (ref: urban)
Rural 1.157 1.155 1.255 0.549 1.041
Age at marriage 1.578*** 1.592*** 1.570*** 1.168 3.519*
Age at marriage
squared
0.988*** 0.988*** 0.988*** 0.994 0.973*
σ u
2 2.648 2.774 3.179 0.477 3.353
Nw,y 5349 5349 4650 506 103
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Nw,y: number of years of exposure in total analysis period for sampled women.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS. Exponentiated coefficients.
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TABLE A5 Odds ratios of second birth by extended conflict status, ever
married women
All women Nonexposed IDPs/refugees Karabakh
residents
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)





Time since first birth (ref: <2 years)
3-6 0.463*** 0.463*** 0.438*** 0.937 0.370
7-10 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.285 1.001
11+ 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.007** 0.119
Calendar year (ref: 1992)
1993 0.819 0.871 0.851 1.048* 1.067*
1994 0.847 0.833 0.822 1.112* 1.026*
1995 0.682* 0.721* 0.705* 0.367 0.563
1996 0.654* 0.690* 0.689* 0.441 0.185
1997 0.623* 0.657* 0.660* 0.411 0.272*
1998 0.670* 0.698* 0.701* 0.481 0.659
1999 0.705* 0.707 0.709 0.702 0.713
2000 0.433*** 0.462*** 0.464*** 0.285 0.119**
2001 0.562** 0.574** 0.576** 0.463 0.155*
2002 0.619* 0.617* 0.620* 0.542 0.369
2003 0.608** 0.602** 0.605** 0.704 0.175*
2004 0.692 0.691 0.694 0.760 0.171**
2005 0.107*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.124** 0.120**
Calendar year (ref: 1992) * IDP/refugee
1993 * Yes 1.042*
1994 * Yes 1.080*
1995 * Yes 0.518
1996 * Yes 0.654
1997 * Yes 0.674
1998 * Yes 0.693
1999 * Yes 0.995
2000 * Yes 0.685
2001 * Yes 0.960
2002 * Yes 1.017
2003 * Yes 1.266
2004 * Yes 1.244
2005 * Yes 1.482
Calendar year (ref: 1992) * Karabakh resident
1993 * Yes 1.022*
1994 * Yes 1.058*
1995 * Yes 0.785
1996 * Yes 0.308
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TABLE A5 (continued)
All women Nonexposed IDPs/refugees Karabakh
residents
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1997 * Yes 0.381
1998 * Yes 0.713
1999 * Yes 0.709
2000 * Yes 0.268*
2001 * Yes 0.278
2002 * Yes 0.563
2003 * Yes 0.288*
2004 * Yes 0.251**
2005 * Yes 1.067
First child died during conflict years (ref: no)
Yes 2.381* 2.485* 0.435 8.251*** 0.683
Sex of first child
(ref: ale)
Female 1.081* 1.076* 1.104* 0.931 1.069
Education (ref: secondary or less)
Secondary-special 0.887 0.887 0.858 1.142 1.483
Higher 0.755* 0.751* 0.780 0.532 0.470
Residence type (ref: urban)
Rural 1.615*** 1.613*** 1.585*** 2.123* 1.496
Age at first birth 0.940*** 0.939*** 0.938*** 0.970 0.886*
σ u
2 0.149 0.100 0.498 0.357
Nw,y 8630 8630 7545 753 332
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Nw,y: number of years of exposure in total analysis period for sampled women.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS. Exponentiated coefficients.
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TABLE A6 Odds ratios of third birth by extended conflict status, ever
married women
All women Nonexposed IDPs/refugees Karabakh
residents
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)





Time since first birth (ref: <2 years)
3-6 0.594*** 0.593*** 0.578*** 0.893 0.552
7-10 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.171*** 0.671 0.230**
11+ 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.056** 0.120*
Calendar year (ref: 1992)
1993 1.041 1.105 1.105 0.658 0.914
1994 0.744 0.802 0.802 0.330 1.040
1995 0.739 0.794 0.795 0.315 1.138
1996 0.878 0.972 0.976 0.338* 0.858
1997 0.704 0.764 0.767 0.345 0.547
1998 0.765 0.82 0.826 0.385 0.805
1999 0.549** 0.62 0.623 0.199* 0.294
2000 0.635* 0.714 0.719 0.256 0.283
2001 0.453*** 0.528** 0.534** 0.116* 0.243
2002 0.545** 0.588* 0.595* 0.272 0.488
2003 0.67 0.752 0.76 0.196* 0.849
2004 0.663* 0.671 0.675 0.606 0.456
2005 0.306*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.395 0.120
Calendar year (ref: 1992) * IDP/refugee
1993 * Yes 0.618
1994 * Yes 0.422
1995 * Yes 0.430
1996 * Yes 0.340
1997 * Yes 0.482
1998 * Yes 0.505
1999 * Yes 0.304
2000 * Yes 0.342
2001 * Yes 0.207
2002 * Yes 0.484
2003 * Yes 0.247*
2004 * Yes 0.824
2005 * Yes 1.030
Calendar year (ref: 1992) * Karabakh resident
1993 * Yes 0.756
1994 * Yes 1.163
1995 * Yes 1.313
1996 * Yes 0.795
/...
554 ARMED CONFLICT AND THE TIMING OF CHILDBEARING IN AZERBAIJAN
TABLE A6 (continued)
All women Nonexposed IDPs/refugees Karabakh
residents
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1997 * Yes 0.635
1998 * Yes 0.929
1999 * Yes 0.453
2000 * Yes 0.393
2001 * Yes 0.470
2002 * Yes 0.829
2003 * Yes 1.116
2004 * Yes 0.673
2005 * Yes 0.396
Second child died during conflict years (ref: no)
Yes 8.310*** 8.357*** 7.841*** 35.310*** 10.396
Sex of previous children (ref: at least one male)
Only female 1.622*** 1.634*** 1.644*** 1.206 2.030
Education (ref: secondary or less)
Secondary-special 0.848 0.842 0.832 0.992 0.575
Higher 0.788 0.779 0.727 1.506 1.977
Residence type (ref: urban)
Rural 2.000*** 1.992*** 2.056*** 1.274 1.420
Age at second
birth
0.942*** 0.941*** 0.943*** 0.918 0.955
σ u
2 0.073 0.021 0.031 0.019 0.340
Nw,y 19730 19730 17182 2196 352
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Nw,y: number of years of exposure in total analysis period for sampled women.
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS. Exponentiated coefficients.
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Appendix B
TABLE B1 Odds ratios of first, second, and third birth by conflict status
(narrow definition)
1st birth 2nd birth 3rd birth
Conflict exposure - narrow definition (ref: not exposed)
Yes 1.185 1.421*** 0.852
Time since first birth (ref: <2 years)
3-6 0.254*** 0.463*** 0.594***
7-10 0.042*** 0.104*** 0.198***
11+ 0.028*** 0.013*** 0.047***
Calendar year (ref: 1992)
1993 1.683* 0.819 1.041
1994 1.892** 0.848 0.743
1995 1.674 0.683* 0.738
1996 1.426 0.655* 0.876
1997 2.203** 0.626* 0.703
1998 2.802*** 0.673* 0.763
1999 1.467 0.709* 0.547**
2000 1.199 0.435*** 0.632*
2001 1.239 0.563** 0.451***
2002 1.765* 0.621* 0.542**
2003 1.715 0.609** 0.668
2004 1.105 0.693 0.660*
2005 0.170*** 0.107*** 0.304***
First child died during conflict years (ref: no)
Yes 2.570*
Sex of first child (ref: male)
Female 1.083*
Second child died during conflict years (ref: no)
Yes 8.298***
Sex of previous children (ref: at least one
male)
Only female 1.615***
Education (ref: secondary or less)
Secondary-special 1.167 0.888 0.846
Higher 1.510 0.756* 0.786
Residence type (ref: urban)
Rural 1.171 1.610*** 2.030***
Age at marriage 1.577***
Age at marriage squared 0.988***
Age at first birth 0.940***
Age at second birth 0.942***
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TABLE B1 (continued)
1st birth 2nd birth 3rd birth
σ u
2 2.643 0.149 0.015
Nw,y 5349 8630 19730
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Nw,y: number of years of exposure in total analysis period for sampled women. Note that models including an
interaction term between calendar year and the conflict exposure measure are not shown for space constraints
(see note 32).
SOURCE: 2006 AZ-DHS. Exponentiated coefficients.
